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    <title>Heartbleed on Compile My Mind</title>
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      <title>The Heartbleed Vulnerability: A Deep Dive into the Buffer Over-Read Flaw</title>
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      <pubDate>Sun, 10 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;h2 id=&#34;1-defining-the-vulnerability&#34;&gt;1. Defining the Vulnerability&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;h3 id=&#34;11-name-and-type&#34;&gt;1.1. Name and Type&lt;/h3&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Heartbleed is a critical flaw classified in cybersecurity literature as a &lt;strong&gt;Buffer Over-Read&lt;/strong&gt; vulnerability. It stems from how OpenSSL handles the TLS Heartbeat extension (RFC 6520). The core issue is remarkably simple: the server never verifies the payload length declared by the client against the actual size of the transmitted data.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;In the C source code, this &lt;code&gt;uint16_t&lt;/code&gt; length parameter is passed directly to the &lt;code&gt;memcpy&lt;/code&gt; function as an input. Consequently, if an attacker sends just 1 byte of data but claims, &amp;ldquo;I sent 65,535 bytes,&amp;rdquo; the server unquestioningly reads a 64 KB chunk from its own memory and transmits it back to the client.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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